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The Mercantilist Motive for Territorial War 
 
Abstract: The promise of a grand peace in the 21st century arising from globalisation 
through liberal economic interdependence and political collective security is less likely due to 
the scarcity of critical resources globally, domestic structures within the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and the capacity for independence of the PRC’s domestic market. Domestic 
demand may outstrip global supply leading to a mercantilist motive for territorial war. This 
paper identifies the systemic context—the success of the multilateral liberal market—and the 
great size of the PRC as potential drivers for China to adopt mercantilist policies which 
include the use of force to acquire resources. This potential for the use of mercantilism, 
which results from a developmental paradox, in addition to the demographic transition 
towards 10 billion people, provides a rationale to employ the perspective of global 
development so as to revise the ideological bases and arising development model of the 
global political economy. 
 
Key Words: China, global development, human security, liberalism, mercantilism, 
population, resources, sovereignty, . 
 
 
领土争夺战背后的重商主义动机 
 
摘要：本文指出了中国可能转向重商主义政策的因素：其中大背景是多边自由市场的
成功，另外还包括中国庞大的体量。重商主义政策包括使用武力来获取资源。实施这
个政策源于发展造成的矛盾，以及人口数量朝着 100 亿发展。这些因素构成了利用全
球发展角度分析问题的基本原理，目的是改变意识形态基础和全球政治经济学的发展
模式。 
 
关键词：中国、全球发展、人类安全、自由主义、重商主义、人口、资源、主权。 
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THE MERCANTILIST MOTIVE FOR TERRITORIAL WAR 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper considers the power of the systemic context within which states make decisions. 
The consequences for and constraints upon the statecraft1 of individual states are considered 
when ideologies give rise to development models to form a global system; and with regard to 
the number of people in the global system. The two dominant ideologies of the 21st century—
mercantilism and liberalism—are determinants of present statecraft, as they are the basis of 
states’ judgements and also constitute the foundation of the system. The restriction of 
statecraft by the systemic context is a determinant of development outcomes. 
 
A finding from this form of systemic analysis is that the success of the global liberal 
multilateral market, combined with the relative size of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
versus other states and the whole system, may necessitate the PRC turning inward for 
demand and acting unilaterally to obtain a sufficient supply of resources. The thesis holds 
that the present systemic context may limit the PRC’s use of liberalism or neo-mercantilism 
and require the use of mercantilist policy. The paper finds that a global development 
perspective which has a focus on human security, if employed to revise the system, will 
enable the PRC to overcome the mercantilist motive for territorial war and facilitate a stable 
global political economy capable of providing development outcomes for the increasing 
global population that is presently undergoing a demographic transition to approximately 10 
billion by the end of this century.  
 
This paper employs global political economy (GPE) as its primary discipline for analysis.2 
However, this paper also utilises the concepts of human security3 and global development. In 
essence, human security places the individual as the primary unit of analysis when assessing 
security. Fundamentally, global development acknowledges that the varying development4 
outcomes for all people are derived from a single global system.5 The variety and disparity of 
development outcomes arise primarily from a lack of cognisance of, and the use of 
development models built from, ideologies which fail to acknowledge the singularity of all 
development’s source. Thus development models fail due to five main reasons: they are 
limited in scope; assume unlimited resources; include some and exclude others; are not 
focused on outcomes; and fail to produce an outcome. 
 
Theoretically, via arrest of failure and dialectic, a deliberate global development outcome 
could be achieved as assessed by human security. Thus through the application of human 
                                                          
1
 The creation and recreation of the state, see Jonathan H. Ping, “Statecraft”, Middle power statecraft: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific, Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, (VT: Ashgate, 2005) 13–22. 
2
 O'Brien, Robert and Marc Williams, Global political economy: Evolution and dynamics (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
3
 For a definition please visit the United Nations Trust Funds for Human Security 2014, accessed August 24, 
2014, http://unocha.org/humansecurity/about-human-security/human-security-all.  
4
 Development is the provision of political and economic goods such as security, water, food, shelter, education, 
health care, or infrastructure. See Rotberg, Robert I. (ed), “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes 
and Indicators,” State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, A World Peace Foundation Book 
(Washington D.C: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 3–4. 
5
 NASA Goddard Space Flight Centre, “The western hemisphere Blue Marble 2012”, accessed August 24, 2014, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/gsfc/6760135001; Blue Marble, Eastern Hemisphere March 2014 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/gsfc/14990033062/ and for further information 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/gsfc/.  
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security and global development, global political economy may be tasked beyond 
mercantilism and liberalism, occasioning a changed systemic context which allows for 
alternative statecraft which is focused on development outcomes. 
 
The political economy of global development 
 
How do we get development outcomes? Ideologies provide positive and normative 
statements about the way the world operates and the way the world should operate, and 
through their use give rise to a development model. Simplistically, mercantilism focuses on 
state domination over the economy; liberalism is market over the state; and Marxism is 
class-based conflict to create the ultimate socialist utopia. Marxism’s lack of application 
systemically or by states as the primary basis for statecraft in the early 21st century enables it 
to be dismissed from this constrained paper. Mercantilism’s all states in competition with all 
others within a zero sum game leads the system towards systemic periodical conflict as the 
balance of power shifts, which potentially undermines any development outcomes produced 
in the preceding period (i.e. world wars). Liberalism efficiently employs resources via 
allowance for the market and price mechanism, and yet if individuals don’t have high 
marginal productivity to warrant income to buy goods and services, they lack access to the 
development outcomes (i.e. in 2015 approximately 75% of the planet’s population in 
underdeveloped6).  
 
Global development cuts across the normative elements of ideologies in that it is more of a 
perspective and is keenly focused on outcomes, rather than policy pronouncements or 
attendance to a specific paradigm. A state may declare goal X, or a multinational corporation 
may provide a product, but what global development is necessitating is the actual outcome. 
What is the development consequence of an ideology for individual people, groups of people 
(nations) and even states? This is the central matter. The greatest measure of global 
development must be the outcome for individuals when human security is the measure, as 
without human security the persistent provision of other political and economic goods is not 
viable.7 
 
Critique of the history of global development 
 
An initial preparatory requirement to sustain the thesis is to critique the history of global 
development regarding ideologies and their utility for global development. Included are both 
villains and heroes from history, and the more recent inventions of human necessity. These 
are mercantilism, liberalism, neo-mercantilism, the liberal market, and also the Chinese 
development model—socialist state-directed market capitalism. A result of this critique is the 
identification of a developmental paradox which may necessitate the PRC’s return to the use 
of mercantilism. 
 
How successful has mercantilism been in creating global development? Mercantilism arose in 
the European political economy and enabled states of Europe to develop; rapidly expanding 
                                                          
6Ruth Alexander, “Where are you on the global pay scale?,” BBC News, 2012, accessed August 24, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17512040 or for data see World Bank 2014, GDP per capita (current US$) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?cid=DEC_SS_WBGDataEmail_EXT.  
7
 Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.), “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in State 
Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, A World Peace Foundation Book (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 3–4. 
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beyond Europe, forming empires which shortly before the Second World War enveloped 
almost the entire world (see map below, noting that the majority of the South American 
colonies gained independence during the 19th century). Development for the bulk of humanity 
in the colonised parts of the world was as a serendipitous consequence of the activities of 
European states to facilitate their own development. The era of European 
colonialism/imperialism arguably left many positive legacies such as common link languages, 
increased education levels, systems of governance and infrastructure, but a broad reading of 
history concludes that the costs of achieving development was significant and injurious. Thus 
the mercantilist anarchic win/lose world system is not particularly effective at creating global 
development where everybody gets a slice of what they need. 
 
World 1936 Empires and Colonies Territory before the Second World War8 
 
 
Led by post-Second World War United States of American (US) institutionalised (World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) hegemony, the 
system progressed past mercantilism to a bipolar structure with half creating a liberal 
multilateral trading system, and this has successfully established through statecraft a 
liberalising market characterised by interdependence.9 With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in December 1991 the interdependent market has become truly global.10 The interdependent 
global reliance of every state is on markets (for manufactured goods, e.g. cars or aircraft; and 
resources, e.g. oil, coal or bauxite) and open sea lines of communication, and the 
acknowledgement of a global common to enable low cost transportation and exchange. The 
PRC is presently very dependent on this global system for domestic stability; however, due to 
its size, there is an alternative that could be created, as discussed below. 
 
The liberal multilateral trading system has also been possible due to the invention of nuclear 
weapons and effective delivery systems, which subdued great power competition and the 
tendency for great powers to employ ultimate mercantilist warfare to achieve the 
mercantilist’s ideal of hegemony. Within the post-1950’s systemic context, mercantilism as a 
basis for statecraft was replaced by neo-mercantilism, with its greater emphasis on the 
                                                          
8
 “World 1936 Empires and Colonies Territory before the Second World War,” accessed August 24, 2014, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_1936_empires_colonies_territory.png.  
9
 Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a 
New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), accessed August 18, 2014, 
http://BOND.eblib.com.au/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1084822.  
10
 John B. Dunlop, “The August 1991 Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics,” Journal Of Cold War Studies 5, 
no. 1 (2003): 94–127, accessed February 3, 2014, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. 
 economy and economic competition between states. Rather than military conflict 
states, competition has been manifest in states
labour policies; with the greatest success being achieved by those 
created an export-orientated developmental state. Examples include Japan and the newly 
industrialised countries of East Asia and post
liberal multilateral trading system
raw materials; managing industrialisation to manufacture products for export
outcompeting rival states in competition 
 
This system of neo-mercantilist states competing within a liberal multilateral trading system 
has led to a more stable and developed system than mercantilist states within a mercantilist 
system, which led to a competitive scramble for colonies so as to monopolise resources, 
cheap labour and markets. 
 
The PRC’s response has been to recognise this opportunity
unique development model, namely 
model is akin to the neo-mercantilist developmental states
divergent. Hayashi states “…China is significantly different due to its history of socialist 
industrialization and Maoist model, 
has been incredibly successful
China Gross Domestic Product, Real, 1978
                                                          
11
 Wonik Kim, “Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of the Developmental State in East Asia
Contemporary Asia, 39 (2009): 3, accessed 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472330902944446
state in the era of globalization: beyond the Northe
23 (2010): 1, accessed August 24, 2014
12
 Jonathan H. Ping, “The Chinese Development Model: International Development and Hegemony,
McCormick, B. & Ping, J. (eds), Chinese Engagements: Regional Issues with Global Implications
Bond University Press, 2011. 
13
 Shigeko Hayashi, “The developmental state in th
political economy,” The Pacific Review
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512740903398330
14
 “China Gross Domestic Product, Real, 197
http://elibrary-data.imf.org/.  
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’ investment, industry, marke
post-colonial 
-1970s China.11 Enabled by the existence of the 
, these states pursued neo-mercantilist goals by 
for power. 
 and build from the late 1970s 
socialist state-directed market capitalism
, sharing many attributes
as well as the size of the country and its population.
, as displayed in the five graphs below.  
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15
 “China Life Expectancy at birth, total (years)
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx
16
 “China Population (1950-2015) and Yearly Growth 
http://www.worldometers.info/world
6 
(years)15 
16
 
,” World Bank, accessed August 31, 2014, 
. 
Rate (%),” Worldometers, accessed August 
-population/china-population/. 
 
 
31, 2014, 
 Socialist state-directed market capitalism is
end of the Second World War
poverty through the sustained provision of political and economic goods.
Nations Development Report 
report: “China performs better than the average BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa] or IBSA [India, Brazil, and South Africa] country in the HDI and in 
components.”17 Since the adoption of socialist 
HDI has increased by approximately 70%
many states, including Indonesia and Thailand 
UNDP report). The PRC’s success through neo
will be politically difficult for them to be altered.
 
Trends in China’s HDI 1980–
 
Developmental paradox 
 
However, a developmental paradox exists for all 
liberal multilateral global trading 
states increases the level of insecurity of future global development. 
success through the export-orientated model 
                                                          
17
 United Nations Development Programme, 
Human Development Report, 2013: 
Profiles/CHN.pdf.  
18
 United Nations Development Programme, 
Human Development Report, 2013: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country
Human Development Reports, accessed August 31, 2014, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-
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 the most successful development model since the 
, as measured by the number of people it has lifted from 
 Thus the United 
The Rise of the South is able to state, and underlines in the 
state-directed market capitalism
, from 0.423 in 1980 to 0.719 in 2014
in its own region (see graph below from the 
-mercantilist policies has been so great th
 
201218 
states in the neo-mercantilist
system. Development success by an increasing number of 
The development 
inside states leads to rising labour 
“The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World,
4, accessed August 24, 2014, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country
“The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World,
3, accessed August 24, 2014,  
-Profiles/CHN.pdf or United Nations Development Programme, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/prof
2-human-development-index-trends-1980-2013. 
all its 
, the PRC’s 
; overtaking 
at it 
 
 states in a 
costs and an 
” 
-
” 
iles/CHN and 
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appreciating currency; while the competition between states increases the scarcity and cost of 
finite resources; enables and necessities multinational corporations to shift capital to states 
with lower cost bases. These combine to make successful states less competitive, leading to a 
relative decline or stagnation (Japan is an example and may indicate a first in, first out 
pattern).19 For the PRC there is an additional developmental paradox arising from its status as 
a great power combined with its pursuit of neo-mercantilism through export-orientated 
industrialisation. Historically, great powers have not been dependent on exports into a liberal 
market. The European great powers established monopolies of trade within empires. The US 
has merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP of approximately 20% or less, whereas the 
PRC peaked at 65% in 2006.20 Developing via exports within a liberal market makes the PRC 
uniquely vulnerable economically, and thus partially undermines the utility of 
neo-mercantilism as a basis for PRC statecraft. 
 
The People’s Republic of China and global development 
 
What alternatives does the PRC have beyond neo-mercantilism for its statecraft? It could 
revert to mercantilism, or it could move to a global development approach. The possible 
triggers for change by the PRC could be that competition for resources becomes 
counterproductive and unviable. Essentially this would manifest as an inability to purchase, 
through the market, enough resources to sustain the domestic economy. Presently, the crucial 
resource required is oil. Given China’s population size, it is uniquely vulnerable to this 
possibility, and a policy response may entail the use of force to secure the required resources. 
This could be facilitated politically through nationalism. The rise of nationalism in the PRC 
and a corresponding lack of engagement or empathy with others in the global system may 
indicate this change. 
 
Another possible trigger is the collapse of global markets by policy design or calamity. 
Without consumers in other states, production for exports will not produce a development 
outcome for the PRC. In response, the PRC may gradually create a large enough domestic 
market to sustain itself, whereby domestic consumers replace the foreign markets. The PRC 
is unique, as also is India, in that its over one billion population provides it with an option to 
sever, or at least reduce, its dependence on the global market (see table below). 
 
Most populous states (Population mid-2014)21 
 
People’s Republic of China 1,364,072,000 
Republic of India 1,296,245,000 
United States of America 317,731,000 
Republic of Indonesia 251,452,000 
The Federal Republic of Brazil 202,769,000 
 
For other states, this may constitute a threat to their own development. Other states in East 
Asia which presently pursue similar neo-mercantilist policies don’t have large enough 
populations to produce and consume domestically so as to achieve the same development 
                                                          
19
 W.R. Garside, Japan’s Great Stagnation: Forging Ahead, Falling Behind. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012, accessed August 24, 2014, http://BOND.eblib.com.au/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=981471. 
20
 World Bank, World Development Indicators, accessed August 24, 2014, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/.  
21
 “Most populous states (Population mid-2014),” Population Reference Bureau, accessed August 24, 2014, 
http://www.prb.org/DataFinder.aspx.  
9 
 
outcome.22 The middle and small powers in East Asia, through sodality, could create a form 
of regionalism akin to the European Union (EU) so as to overcome their population/market 
size limitations. However, presently this is politically and economically challenging for the 
EU23, and thus presumably even more complex in East Asia given the historical, territorial 
and development level disparities which exceed those of Europe.24 Their other option is to 
draw in a global power which has a large enough market, such as the US. 
 
However, by drawing the US into the region for an economic rationale, politically a 
mercantilist dilemma arises, as the PRC as a great power is threatened in its own region by 
another extra regional great power. Such policies may encourage the application of 
mercantilism by the PRC, undermining the possibility of moving to a global development 
perspective. A response by the PRC to enable global development would be to increase 
imports so as to provide a market for smaller exporting states. 
 
Systemic context as a rationale for a global development perspective 
 
Ideologies and the arising development models provide utility within a systemic context. If 
the context is changing, a change in ideology and development model may be required to 
ensure sustained or increased utility. Presently the global population is projected to increase 
from seven to approximately 10–12 billion.25 This will occasion an increase in resource 
scarcity.26 The consequences of the scarcity assessed by mercantilism envisions higher levels 
of conflict between states. Liberalism’s incomes and consumption, based on marginal 
productivity, may leave many unable to purchase as scarcity increases prices. However, the 
global development perspective is outcomes-focused, enabling potentially an alternative to 
conflict or high prices. 
 
When Westphalian sovereignty was first established in 1648, the global population was 
approximately 500 million.27 This form of sovereignty increased security and human security 
by establishing “…supreme legitimate authority within a territory.”28 It has been 
developmentally effective for individual states and has allowed for practical development 
outcomes for large numbers of individual people, and yet it contains exclusivity; a division of 
the geography which is observed politically and yet doesn’t reflect the economic necessity.  
 
                                                          
22
 The sustainability of an exports-based economy and the policies required to move to domestic-demand-
oriented growth strategies were outlined in the 2013 Trade And Development 
Report, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, accessed May 30, 2014, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2013_en.pdf. 
23
 Joan DeBardeleben and Crina Viju, Economic Crisis in Europe: What it means for the EU and Russia. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, accessed July 30, 2014, 
http://BOND.eblib.com.au/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1161405 and Jan Zielonka, Is the EU Doomed? Hoboken: 
Wiley, 2014, accessed June 30, 2014, http://BOND.eblib.com.au/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1708790. 
24
 Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization. 
West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest ebrary, accessed November 5, 2014. 
25
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-19/world-population-could-hit-12b-by-2100-demographers/5755148  
26
 For an overview and innovative modelling see L. Bretschger, “Population Growth and Natural-Resource 
Scarcity: Long-Run Development under Seemingly Unfavorable Conditions,” The Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 115 (2013): 722–755. doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12017. 
27
 Matt Rosenburg, “Current World Population”, About Education, accessed September 30, 2014, 
http://geography.about.com/od/obtainpopulationdata/a/worldpopulation.htm.  
28
 Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History”, Journal of International Affairs, Winter, 
Vol. 48, No. 2 (1995): 357. 
 To obtain global development
model may be required to enable the 
cooperation. Greater levels of cooperation
geographical polity relationship 
sovereignty. It would theoretically aim to enable greater cooperation
development, focusing on outcomes.
territorial exclusivity, but rather the use of one
development as built from statecraft
 
How does this perspective alter the analysis of contemporary 
islands in the East and South China Sea
manifestations such as the nine dash line
the present and future increased population, demand for resources, and need for higher levels 
of development.29 As displayed below
present numbers when the nine 
perspective points a way past contemporary problems
radically changing nature of human society
historic and unprecedented demographic
graph below). 
 
Global Population 1800 – 2100
 
                                                          
29
 Zhiguo Gao  and Bing Bing Jia, “
Implications,” The American Journal of International Law
2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1346762263?accountid=26503.
30
 Wikimedia Commons, accessed August
Population-1800-2100.svg  
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 and manage the demographic transfer, a changed development 
orientation of states’ policies from competition to 
, with a focus on outcomes, may require 
to match the radically changed global population
 for higher levels of 
 This would not entail the complete abandonment of 
’s territory for the common goal of global 
, guided by the systemic context of global development.
territorial disputes
s? Historical precedents—even with modern 
 of 1953—would be made vacuous 
, the global population was approximately 
dash line was first published. In this manner
 by incorporating history
, which is presently part of the way through an 
 transition from one to approximately 
30
 
The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, And 
 107, no. 1 (01, 2013): 98–124, 
 
 24, 2014, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWorld
a different 
—a new 
 
, such as over 
by acceptance of 
one third of 
, theoretically, the 
, but also the 
ten billion (see 
 
accessed February 3, 
-
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This paper is concerned with global development outcomes, rather than the enforcement of 
Westphalian claims of exclusivity to reminisce about past imperial glory. The global 
development perspective requires the cognition that all states’ and peoples’ development is 
obtain from a single global system. The use of liberalism and neo-mercantilism erroneously 
ignores the single global source of development, thus allowing justification of differentiated 
development outcomes. In critiquing the contemporary global political economy and its 
utility for development, the goal is to benefit Chinese individuals, the PRC and other 
claimants in the territorial disputes of East Asia. The mercantilist motive for territorial war 
may be avoided through dialectic of global development to undermine the present systemic 
power of neo-mercantilism and liberalism. This could be realised through modification by a 
global development perspective which allows for statecraft through an evolved form of 
sovereignty. A requirement of this is the utility of systemic power, allowing for forms of 
statecraft and sovereignty to enable development outcomes as measured by human security 
for approximately 10 billion people before the end of the century. 
